Wicked: For Good was the star of the show in two recent back‑to‑back copyright rulings from Halley J in the Federal Court of Australia.

The plot? Good defeats evil: copyright villains melt while trying to spoil a major film release. And there’s no complicated notion of who’s truly wicked here. The green-faced pirate witches are the nasty ones.

What happened?

In the first judgment, Halley J granted site‑blocking and ancillary orders under section 115A of the Australian Copyright Act requiring a cohort of Australian ISPs to disable access to 52 offshore online locations offering infringing streams and downloads.

Recognising the looming release window for the new movie, the Court split the list into “Urgent Target Online Locations” and “Standard” targets. The urgent set had to be blocked on a truncated timetable, with redirection to an explanatory landing page and familiar technical measures to give the orders bite. The orders run for three years and include the now‑standard mechanics for adding new domains, URLs and IP addresses, and for affected operators to apply to vary or discharge the injunction if they think they’ve been wrongly targeted.

In the second judgment, the Court dealt with the sequel: domain hopping. A number of the blocked locations promptly reappeared via fresh domain name addresses. Rather than wait out the usual “notify-object-disable” procedure (which would have left those routes open for the valuable part of the release window), Halley J directed the ISPs to disable access via “Additional Urgent Access Means” within days, importing the same redirection and technical framework from the first order. The respondents consented, except for one “reasonable endeavours” timing qualification from one ISP, that the Court accommodated.

The two decisions are linked in every meaningful sense: same parties, same proceeding, same judge, same legal basis, and a coordinated remedy – first to block known piracy hubs, then to close their newly opened back doors.

Why did the studios win and why?

Because their evidence comfortably satisfied the statutory test. The Court was persuaded that each target location was outside Australia and had the primary purpose or effect of infringing or facilitating infringement of copyright. It was also satisfied that the infringements were flagrant. Ownership of copyright was sufficiently established (with the benefit of presumptions), the operators were unresponsive to notices and other remedies were impracticable given the offshore location of the sites.

On discretion, the balance was decidedly pro‑injunction. The sites were simple to use, monetised through advertising, and organised in a way that made infringement frictionless. Disabling access was proportionate and in the public interest. The ISPs either filed submitting notices or consented, and the orders were drafted with guardrails: clear technical options for compliance, user redirection to an explanatory page, liberty to apply, and cost recovery for DNS blocking at a set per‑domain rate.

In the second decision, urgency carried the day. The usual 22 working‑day pathway for adding new domains would have left infringing access open for most of the release window (the period when the movie is hot in the cinemas), undermining the effectiveness of the initial relief. That practical reality justified accelerated orders targeting the additional means of access.

Why is the case significant to IP practitioners?

Copyright law sometimes moves slower than technology. Here it’s fascinating to see it work with decisive speed.

First, it is a textbook demonstration of section 115A working as intended – and working fast. The Court tailored timetables to the commercial cadence of a film release, then reinforced the initial injunction with a rapid “No 2” order that shifted with the pirates. Practitioners advising rightsholders can point to a clear, two‑step playbook: block the known locations, and be ready to move swiftly on “additional access means” when phoenix domains appear.

Second, these rulings sit squarely in the line of authority, including a separate but similar case we reported on in our July blog. The Court expressly aligned the orders with recent site‑blocking cases involving the same applicants and respondent ISPs, including decisions in 2024 and mid‑2025. The continuity matters. It shows a settled remedial process: three‑year duration, redirection notices, streamlined update mechanisms, and scope for affected operators to be heard. Australian courts are apparently comfortable deploying this flowchart repeatedly.

Third, for ISPs the message is cooperative compliance with clear options for dealing with exceptional problems. For platforms and studios, it’s about building an evidentiary record that ties new domains, URLs and IPs to the original targets – same branding, content, contact details, registrants – so that the Court can confidently fold the new routes into the existing net.

Finally, the tone from the bench is unambiguous. When infringement is blatant and offshore, Australian courts will target the domestic chokepoints to keep unlawful content out. If pirates sprint, the orders can sprint too.

For those interested in the full details, the case citations are:

Universal City Studios LLC v Telstra Limited [2025] FCA 1390 (12 November 2025)

Universal City Studios LLC v Telstra Limited (No 2) [2025] FCA 1485 (25 November 2025)

And don’t you love it that the sequel judgment has an unimaginative identical name to the original, but with a big fat “No 2” at the end?